Decoys Cannot Go Everywhere: Mapping the Deception Surface in MITRE ATT&CK

Decoys Cannot Go Everywhere: Mapping the Deception Surface in MITRE ATT&CK arXiv:2606.27966v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cyber deception research often assumes that a decoy can be placed wherever there is attacker behavior. This work tests that assumption across MITRE ATT&CK v18.1. We introduce a four-criterion rubric for infrastructure deception and apply it to all 250 ATT&CK techniques. The rubric evaluates whether a defender-controlled decoy can be placed, wheth…

https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.27966

sha256:dacf40a3aa019fd60225114d33f420d0b2212b5f660ed7b7c157c490612c6975

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