INTEL_REPORT
arXiv — Cryptography & Security (cs.CR) · published 7/7/2026, 4:00:00 AM · TLP amber
Summary
Ingested excerpt (first ~500 chars of normalized text).
Git Hash Chain Malleability arXiv:2607.02820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Git commit signing is widely entrusted to serve as evidence that a commit hash uniquely and immutably identifies a specific piece of signed content. We show this invariant does not hold. Given any signed commit, an attacker without access to the signing key, and without breaking SHA2 can produce a second, distinct commit with an identical tree, identical metadata, a valid signature, and a ``Verified'…
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.02820
sha256:e80ed26829b26eb0cd53bd54d14230747e06f86128e6028c1ac42d447b12148b
What we pulled out
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Indicators
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Malware families
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Threat actors mentioned
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ATT&CK techniques
MITRE IDs referenced in text and present in local technique table.
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