INTEL_REPORT
arXiv — Cryptography & Security (cs.CR) · published 5/19/2026, 4:00:00 AM · TLP amber
Summary
Ingested excerpt (first ~500 chars of normalized text).
Securing LLM Agents Need Intent-to-Execution Integrity arXiv:2605.16976v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This position paper argues that securing LLM agents requires first defining an end-to-end correctness property that specifies when an agent's execution faithfully reflects the user's intent. Modern LLM agents operate over an \emph{intent-to-execution pipeline}, where natural-language instructions are translated into concrete system operations such as tool calls, API request…
https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16976
sha256:336073a75e2d446021b5f7c6c6970481bcf690ece254f932b769d953c79edf14
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