Forensia CTI Core

Summary

Ingested excerpt (first ~500 chars of normalized text).

TanStack Npm Packages Compromised Inside The Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack On May 11, 2026, the Mini Shai-Hulud worm compromised 84 npm package artifacts across 42 @tanstack/* packages (as well as @squawk/*, @mistralai/* packages, and others) by chaining a GitHub Actions "Pwn Request," cache poisoning, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory — producing the first npm supply chain attack with valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations. Here's what happened, what was sto…

https://snyk.io/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised

sha256:2be394a3b54bc6673ed9f2f65a62d18293dfe917d7660ce82574662990b24db2

What we pulled out

Deterministic extractor (IOC + allowlisted tokens + ATT&CK IDs present in DB).

cve1
md50
url2
ipv41
ipv60
sha12
domain40
sha2563
malware_token0
attack_pattern0
threat_actor_token0

Indicators

Linked with report → mentions → indicator. Values open the indicator workspace.

Type	Value	Link
domain	github.com	Open →
domain	package.json	Open →
domain	setup.mjs	Open →
domain	runner.worker	Open →
domain	settings.json	Open →
domain	users.noreply.github.com	Open →
domain

Malware families

Allowlist token matches only.

None extracted.

Threat actors mentioned

Allowlist mentions — not a formal attribution verdict.

None extracted.

ATT&CK techniques

MITRE IDs referenced in text and present in local technique table.

None linked (import ATT&CK or adjust text).

CONTINUE INVESTIGATION

High-signal pivots without leaving the thread you started in search.

All reports
Browse the report corpus.
Intel graph (first IOC)
Neighborhood from the first linked indicator.

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